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Larry Kramer's The People Themselves' appears to argue the
following: the Constitution has, until the past few decades, been
understood as a repository of fundamental law that was made and was
to be interpreted by the people themselves. Since shortly after the
founding, Americans and their politicians and constitutional theorists
have recognized some place for judicial review on constitutional
questions, but this was not generally understood to involve judicial
supremacy. The people themselves were normally taken-despite
frequent movements to the contrary that were unsuccessful--to be
ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. But in the past few decades,
and in particular, in the past ten years, the United States Supreme
Court has seized the power not only to engage in judicial review, but
also to be the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning. And the
Court has falsely represented that this has always been our nation's
constitutional understanding of the allocation of ultimate interpretive
authority. This shift in ultimate interpretive power has been
proceeding, without argument or precedent, and has transferred, in
effect, a significant amount of power to the nine individuals on the
Court. Kramer's critique culminates in a demand that the Court
should stop engaging in its power-usurping and unjustifiable decision
making practices and, in any case, the public should stop passively
putting up with it.
My main critical claim is that Kramer's critique cannot be sustained
within the framework that he advances. On the other hand, I argue
that some of the spirit of his critical conclusions can be sustained, at
least in significant part, within a somewhat less innovative framework
of constitutional theory. I shall argue that at least for the provisions
that seem to concern Kramer the most-Article I powers-the Court
should be understood to have-at least prima facie-supreme
authority in interpreting the Constitution. However, I will also
contend that the materials of Kramer's argument suggest that the
Court should understand itself as having a responsibility to temper its
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conception of its own supremacy so as to display proper respect for
the project of constitutional democracy. In short, I shall argue against
the more aggressive version of Kramer's thesis that the people
themselves are the supreme constitutional interpreters, but offer some
support (at least in principle) for a weaker version of it: that the
Court ought to take seriously the reasons for deference sounding in
constitutional theory. The Court ought to credit a view in which its
supremacy in review of Article I powers is tempered by respect for
Congress and the people, by understanding the congressional ability
to capture the people in a broad sense, by awareness of its own
fallibility as decision maker, and by recognition of the peculiar status
of constitutional law and judicial supremacy in our national
experience.
I have two questions with regard to Kramer's effort to argue that
interpretive supremacy in constitutional law belongs to the people
themselves. The first is whether Kramer's idea of the people
themselves interpreting the Constitution can withstand scrutiny. The
second is whether Kramer fully confronts the strength of the
argument for judicial supremacy, at least in certain domains of
constitutional law.
I. WHO IS "THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES" AND WHAT HAVE THEY
SAID?
A. The People Themselves
Kramer offers a depiction of the framers' understanding of
constitutional law that is in some ways quite conventional and in other
ways quite ambitious. A central-and I believe quite plausible-claim
is that constitutional law was understood as fundamental law, or basic
law. What is meant by fundamental law, according to Kramer, is
complex, but it is in significant part norms that together constitute an
understanding of what shall have the status of law.' "Fundamental
law" does not, contra some other constitutional theorists (Kramer
seems to have Dworkin in mind), connote anything about
fundamental moral precepts that courts are well equipped to
interpret.
A second contention is that the meaning of the Constitution is to be
determined by the people themselves. Now this second contention
could be taken in a few different ways. At one level is the claim that
the status of constitutional law as positive law depends not on whether
some sovereign has commanded it, but whether the people themselves
2. See id. at 10, 19. Kramer's effort to downplay the significance of Dr.
Bonham's Case is not about whether constitutional law is fundamental in this sense,
but about whether the courts have the authority to use the Constitution to strike
down legislation. See id. at 19-20.
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have agreed to it. It is the people's ratification that counts, or
counted. At another level is the assertion that what parts of the
Constitution mean is a matter of what the people meant or
understood or intended in ratifying it. Let us assume that both of
these are true.
Where Kramer seems to want to arrive is a third contention: that
what the people today interpret the Constitution as meaning is what
ought to be considered most authoritative on what the Constitution
means.3 Now I believe there are several problems with drawing this
conclusion. At the moment, I want to look at two such problems: (1)
the view of the people (today) regarding what the Constitution means
has no clear relevance to (or probativeness of) what the Constitution
means, and (2) it is difficult to ascertain what view the people (today)
hold of what the Constitution means, because it is difficult to know
what counts as an expression of such a view.
The first should be obvious: It does not follow from the fact that
the people ratified the Constitution that what the people believe now
is meant by constitutional provisions ought to be considered
authoritative. This is so for any number of reasons. Obviously, the
people then and the people now are different. There is, of course,
continuity. But if the premise of the argument is the privilege
attaching to self-knowledge about meaning ("I know what I meant";
"we know what we meant"), continuity is not enough. Obviously
Kramer would want to concede that the public body is not especially
expert in the history of the intentions of the framing generation. In
addition, he does not push an account according to which the key is to
understand the intentions of the people at that time. The problem is
that the observation that the Constitution is the people's law does not
yield any obvious payoff for the authority of "the people" now. The
most straightforward route for getting there does not work, for it
depends on an equivocation in what "the people" refers to.
Let me make this argument a bit more specific. First, if the written
Constitution is law-and I believe that Kramer and I agree that it is4-
and if we assume for the purposes of argument that the beliefs or
intentions of the maker of the law is relevant to what the content of
the law is, then it would be the actual maker, not the successor, whose
views count especially heavily. While it may well be that there is great
legal authority in a post (like Congress or the President) whose actual
occupant changes over time, and while I would be willing to accept
that "the people" could be understood in this manner, it does not
follow that interpretive authority on the meaning of the law goes with
the post. A natural, though not necessary, inference might be that the
3. Id. at 227, 248.
4. Id. at 24.
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prerogative to amend travels with the post, but this is not what
Kramer is suggesting.'
One might think that the criticism I have articulated-"the people
now are not competent to say what the people then thought" - is
improperly tied to a version of original understanding involving the
people as ratifiers. I do indeed believe that the lure of Kramer's
position may be related to this sort of slippage. But this is not to say
that my critique would diminish in strength if Kramer's view were
attached to another sort of understanding of what determines
constitutional meaning (as it is). Consider a textualist account of
constitutional meaning. Why should the people be expert on what the
text of the Constitution means? The idea that it is "their" text carries
no particular weight, for it is not true in any meaningful sense; they
did not speak it in any sense pertinent here, and while it is theirs in the
sense that it is the people and the people alone who can change it, we
are not talking about amendment. Of course, one might argue that
the Court is not any more expert on the text-that there is no expert
on the meaning of the text. But here, again, I am not sure that this is
true. The Court is able to do more detailed history, more detailed
interpretation, repeated applications, and, of course, it has much
greater familiarity with law.
Indeed, I (like Kramer and most other lawyers and theorists) am
skeptical that any pure version of originalism or textualism will be
adequate.6 Interpretation of the Constitution is a particular kind of
activity subject to a wide variety of practical norms, which point to
history, text, intention, coherence, and many other considerations. To
be sure, lawyers do a lot of it, and their activity is in many ways better
developed than non-legal interpretation of documents like
constitutions. As Sanford Levinson has pointed out, views about
expertise in interpretation involve their own judgments (political,
moral, institutional, and other) in a variety of ways.7 But this is far
from an argument that the people (today) do have great expertise.
And it is far from denying that courts have greater expertise than the
people (now). The tempting idea-that because we are a democracy
and were designed as such, because the framers understood the
people's ratification as central, and because there was among legal
constitutional theorists well-justified concern about too arrogant and
too aggressive a judiciary-does not add up to an argument that the
people (now) have a special competence in constitutional
interpretation. They do not even add up to an argument that their
competency is greater than or equal to that of courts. This is not to
say that I have an argument for judicial prerogative in interpretation
(that will come later) or that I reject arguments for certain forms of
5. Id. at 52-54.
6. Id.
7. See generally Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
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judicial deference and attentiveness to the people; I accept such
arguments, but that, too, will come later.
B. Expressions by the People Themselves
A second problem is that Kramer does not adequately explain how
the people could express their interpretive views. The most obvious
suggestion is that they do so through Congress, but then it seems we
are talking about a conflict between branches, not between the
judiciary and the people. And, of course, by putting the phrase "the
people themselves" in his title, Kramer is deliberately emphasizing
that he does not mean to be referring to the people "through" another
body, such as a legislature. Perhaps the ratification of the
Constitution, as well as the amendment procedures, by not depending
on any one body, are meant to be instances of "the people
themselves." But then, of course, we have Article V, and we are not
talking about interpretation any longer.
At some points in the book, Kramer mentions events in which the
people express themselves on the occasion of particular elections, and
these moments are ones that he sees as expressing the people's will on
a certain issue.8 Yet these moments are few and far between both in
the book, and, I would conjecture, in American history. And on such
occasions, the decisions are not expressly issue-specific, and so it is
hard to believe that Kramer really wants to commit himself to the
view that these episodes can safely be understood as interpretive acts
of the people themselves.
At certain points in the book, Kramer expresses the interesting view
that the people manage to retain primacy not by virtue of any one
special branch, but by virtue of the fact that no branch (or process) is
special.9 In this sense, one might say, "the people themselves" refers
to the distillate of the people through a variety of different branches.
If Kramer's view were simply that Congress must be "preferred" (no
branch, as such, is preferred, even-or especially-the judiciary) as
the authentic expression of the people, this view would have its own
problems. But that, apparently, is not quite Kramer's view. Yet even
if this view escapes some problems, it more deeply entrenches the
problematic dependency of Kramer on the interpretation of the
phrase "the people themselves." For it makes the views of "the
people themselves" virtually impossible to identify, as a practical
matter. And as a theoretical matter, it casts serious doubt on the
already problematic idea that there is such a thing as an interpretation
accepted by "the people themselves."
Much of the most interesting history and the most evocative
political discourse in the book would appear to address this precise
8. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 49 (discussing the election of 1800).
9. See id. at 109.
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problem, but in fact creates further confusion. Thus, for example,
Kramer refers at several junctures to public protests, to mobbing, and
to a variety of other expressive activities of "the people," in response
to their dissatisfaction with judicial interpretations of parts of the
Constitution.") It appears that these are examples of the people
themselves expressing their views of constitutional meaning. And,
indeed, Kramer invites the twenty-first century American public to
take to the streets, to say, like William Holden in Network, that "we
are not going to take it (judicial usurpation of power) anymore!"11
These seem to be reported (and proposed) instances of the people
themselves engaging in constitutional interpretation. But there is no
way to read constitutional interpretation by the people from such
episodes. Rather, these are acts of public resistance to the courts, and
expressions with public disapproval of, and disagreement with, the
courts' approach. They may or may not be warranted, but they do
nothing to answer the problem of how the Court should be
ascertaining what the people think the Constitution means.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
I turn now to an affirmative argument for judicial supremacy in at
least some areas of constitutional interpretation. The argument draws
from a recent article by Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf.12 I shall
ultimately offer a qualified defense of part of their thesis.
If a court is asked to resolve a controversy between litigants
brought before it, the court will have to decide what the law is.
Implicit in this task is deciding whether what litigants assert the law to
be is in fact valid law. For if it is not valid law, then it cannot be
applied as law. But determinations of whether the putative law is
valid law frequently require determinations of whether the putative
law violates the Constitution. On this question, the courts are
required to engage in judicial review. If the judiciary is supposed to
resolve the case or controversy definitively, which Article III
contemplates, then its decision must be supreme. In Adler and Dorf's
terms, constitutional provisions express conditions for the existence of
statutory law as valid law, they express "existence conditions."13
My argument, like Adler and Dorf's, is a variation on a quite widely
adopted interpretation of Justice Marshall's argument in Marbury v.
Madison: as the judiciary must apply the law and doing so sometimes
integrally involves pieces of constitutional interpretation, the judiciary
10. See id. at 27-28.
11. See id. at 247-48.
12. Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions
and Judicial Review, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2003).
13. See id. at 1108-09.
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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must weigh in on constitutional interpretation. Add to this that, as to
particular cases and controversies, the judiciary is supreme, and one
has an argument for judicial supremacy on at least some issues of
constitutional interpretation. Kramer confronts closely related
arguments; he offers a fascinating account of Marbury as a political
finesse by Marshall (rather than as a true argument in constitutional
theory), and he offers many arguments against treating constitutional
law as ordinary law, but I am not persuaded that he confronts this
basic argument.
One of the reasons Kramer finds the judicial supremacy argument
implausible is that so many other countries-like Canada-have
found it entirely plausible to permit judicial review but not judicial
supremacy. If it really is essential to the very idea of constitutional
rights, why is it that the world is full of intelligent and thoughtful legal
systems that have constructed something that more adequately
recognizes the ultimate power of the people, and nevertheless
conceives of itself as a constitutional democracy with judicial review?
It seems to me that the Adler/Dorf argument for judicial review
depends on the claim that the constitutional provision in question is
what H.L.A. Hart called a "power-conferring rule"15 or, more
generally, a power-constraining provision. More precisely, it must be
a constitutional provision that the judiciary could only plausibly
understand as constraining, conferring, or defining the power to make
law of whichever body in question created the law the application of
whicfi is properly before the Court. In such cases, the argument for
judicial review is a very powerful argument for de jure judicial
supremacy, not simply for judicial review. For if the Court is required
to apply the putative law, and if the status of the putative law as law is
at issue by virtue of questions about the power of the relevant entity
to make law (such as that before the Court), then it follows that the
Court's power to decide the case entails the power to decide upon the
status of the law as valid law.
I hope it is evident why I think that this is not a particularly
palatable line of argument for most liberal constitutional theorists. It
is because the argument is especially promising as a means for
defending judicial supremacy where the scope of Article I powers is at
issue, as in Lopez 16 or Morrison.7 In those cases, a litigant has asked
the Court to affirm lower court action premised on the defendant's
having violated a law that Congress claimed Article I (or Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five) power to create. The defendant argued to
the Court that the putative law was not valid, because it went beyond
congressional power. The Court's Article III power to decide whether
15. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994).
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Congress had the power to make the law is implicit in its Article III
power to decide whether a federal law was violated. Indeed, the
people themselves granted the power to create federal law, but
granted limited power. The rights of the litigants to the resolution of
the case as a matter of law requires a decision on whether the putative
law is valid law, absent some affirmative reason to defer on the
question of validity or to presume validity. But then there is a
decision on the validity of law, albeit one encompassed within a
framework of deference or presumption. And that decision is
supreme. I am not arguing against such deference or presumption
(and indeed, I am inclined to argue for it), but it is the judiciary's
power to choose to defer. This is what I mean by "de jure judicial
supremacy." It may well be that an adequate understanding of our
constitutional system would lead, ultimately, to a judicial adoption of
congressional supremacy on these issues, as James Bradley Thayer
perhaps would have liked.18 But this would be, in an important sense,
a lack of "de facto judicial supremacy," as I shall call it. 19
Now what I believe is most interesting about this line of analysis is
that it does not necessarily lead to de jure judicial supremacy on all
issues of constitutional interpretation. Most strikingly-and perhaps,
again, most disappointingly- it does not necessarily lead to judicial
supremacy for some provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Fourth
Amendment, for example, provides that people shall be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures." This is quite naturally
interpreted as imposing a (negative) duty upon the government to
refrain from engaging in certain kinds of actions against private
persons, and, correlatively, conferring a right upon individuals against
such governmental conduct. One need not interpret this as
conferring, constraining, or limiting, any lawmaking power. Of course
one could do so; one could view it as rendering invalid laws requiring
public employees to submit to drug searches, for example. Indeed, I
happen to be very sympathetic to understanding Fourth Amendment
rights as having extensive implications regarding the validity of
various laws, and the propriety of judicial review and judicial
supremacy for them. But I see a cogent way (in principle, if not,
perhaps, given longstanding doctrine) to understand the Fourth
Amendment as leaving open this question: We do not have to
understand the people themselves as having limited Congress's
lawmaking powers by enacting the Fourth Amendment.
18. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice 89-90 (2004) (discussing Thayer's rule of clear mistake).
19. As I understand it, decisions like Lopez and Morrison are part, but not all, of
what Kramer believes displays an unjustifiable attitude toward judicial supremacy on
the Rehnquist Court. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 225; see also Larry D. Kramer,
Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001).
20. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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It would be wrong to think, however, that just because some rights
provision is duty imposing, it is not also power constraining. The Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment states specifically that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.2 This
clause is most naturally understood as both duty imposing and as
power constraining. And note that one might very naturally adopt a
general interpretive norm, for historical, moral, political,
jurisprudential, or other reasons, saying that duty-imposing provisions
of the Bill of Rights are to be understood as simultaneously power
constraining (indeed, it appears that the Court has done so). But it
strikes me that to the extent that this is an open issue, and that there is
no independent argument for supremacy on that issue, it cannot be
established that there is de jure supremacy on those rights provisions.
If this account is along the right lines, then we can see why judicial
supremacy is, at least de jure, a strong part of the American system
but not part of many other nations' systems. It is because the federal
government was created by the framers as a government of limited
powers. To the extent that Kramer is right to view the Constitution as
fundamental law, a significant part of the fundamental law is defining
the powers of Congress to make law. In conjunction with a broad
Article III, that fundamental law entails judicial supremacy.
Insofar as a country like Canada includes a "notwithstanding
clause," it is not geared to power-conferring or power-constraining
rules as such. It is geared to constitutional provisions as duty-
imposing rules. A court that interprets this sort of constitutional
provision is, arguably, like a court interpreting a statute forbidding a
certain kind of conduct, so that the constitutional provision is
understood as an importantly entrenched, initially judicially
reviewable, but not ultimately legislatively immutable provision
forbidding conduct of the legislative branch itself. Then the
legislature holds the power to interpret the Constitution, qua norms
governing state conduct, in the way it chooses: in this sense, it has
placed in the Constitution something that is applicable to itself and
interpretable by the judiciary, but can be overridden by the
legislature. It is therefore not a power-constraining rule. It is true
that Dworkin and others have argued that the whole idea of rights
sometimes entails protection from majority expression of will. But
even if we assume that this insight militates against a constitutional
structure that would permit the people (via a legislative body) to be
supreme, the insight is not directly responsive to the claim that it is
legally cogent to treat the people (or Congress) as supreme in this
respect.
The reason that our system requires some modicum of judicial
supremacy is that the central provisions of Article I are power-
21. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.
14712005]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conferring rules, and that Congress is treated, by the people's
constitution, as having its powers because of Article I. One could do
what Ackerman does, and claim that Article I was amended
informally in the New Deal years by the people.22 I do not accept that,
and I doubt that Kramer does either. If this is right, then Lopez and
Morrison, like Marbury, are squarely in the area of judicial
supremacy. The Eleventh Amendment cases are closer, but in the
end, it is very plausible that the Eleventh Amendment diminishes the
judiciary's power under Article III, and relatedly diminishes
Congress's power under Article I to create federal law that leads to
certain kinds of cases under Article III. If that is so, then Eleventh
Amendment questions are proper ones for judicial supremacy (note
that the key to this argument for judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation has nothing to do with a branch's being the judge in its
own case).
Of course, Kramer's comment about other nations' constitutional
systems (and the lack of supremacy) is only one among many arrows
he aims at judicial supremacy. But I think this model permits us to
evaluate a broader set of reasons and arguments. First, insofar as
state judicial review, and historical conceptions of judicial review are
part of his basis for arguing that we have abandoned the historical
understanding of judicial review, this is not necessarily fully on point;
state constitutions did not, in the way the Federal Constitution did,
create the power to make law, so much as constrain it and/or declare
obligations of the states. Second, during the early period of the
nation, it was not as obvious as it is now that the people who created
the Constitution (and who knew what they meant) were no longer in
existence. More to the point, it is not clear to me that those who
railed against judicial review and judicial supremacy grasped the fact
that a day would come when the Constitution as law was detached
from those who in fact made it, so that the phrase "the people
themselves," apart from Article V, did not have any clear referent.
Third, some of Kramer's arguments about judicial supremacy and
court-centered views of constitutional interpretation express a sort of
skepticism about the lawyers' and judges' culture of legal
interpretation. It is as if some thinkers believe the methods of legal
reasoning taught in law school and practiced by judges and lawyers
really do get to meaning better than an intelligent person's
interpretation. Kramer is wary of such claims, and seems to believe a
sort of dogmatic faith in this contingent and conventional
methodology is part of the reason for judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation. I share some of Kramer's skepticism
about methods of legal reasoning, but I think the argument I have
drawn from Marbury, and from Adler and Dorf, casts the debate in a
22. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991).
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different light. When we are bringing constitutional interpretation
into the discussion not (as, for example, Lawrence Sager sometimes
wishes) 23 for inspiring or undercutting legislative or executive projects,
but actually for determining the validity of a piece of law in the
context of judicial application to which litigants have a right, then the
issue of constitutional interpretation is placed, by virtue of the
question, within a judicial setting in which norms of legal reasoning
are in place. While this may leave open a variety of questions about
the Constitution outside the courts (perhaps about the permissibility,
appropriateness, or requiredness of conduct), it does not leave open
questions about cases like Lopez and Morrison, or, more generally,
cases where the validity of law must be decided in order to determine
a litigant's legal rights, because what is at issue is whether putative
laws are valid in light of what the litigant asserts was a limitation on
the power of the government making law.
I take it that the largest set of reasons motivating Kramer's
rejection of judicial supremacy is none of those mentioned above. It
is, rather, a set of political theoretic concerns that he would advocate
with full force now and that do not particularly track the
power/validity issues. As to the concerns that really motivate him, it is
not just the facts of history as a matter of original understanding as
authority to which he is appealing. It is that these political theoretic
concerns are sound and are far more continuous with understandings
throughout our history than the current views of judicial supremacy.
As indicated below, I do not believe that my acceptance of what I call
de jure or prima facie judicial supremacy precludes my acceptance of
this larger set of reasons. I turn to these now.
III. A SOFTER ARGUMENT AGAINST JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
There is a softer interpretation of what Kramer is up to. Although
less provocative, this softer view is far more defensible, is fairly widely
held, and is a view that Kramer himself has articulated and embraced
here, and which an earlier essay of his nicely anticipates. 4 The softer
view is that it has always been part of our shared understanding of the
political culture of constitutionalism that the judiciary should be
hesitant to exercise its power to interfere with what is in the first
instance the activities of other branches. It should be judicious. The
reason is that the very idea of a constitutional democracy carries with
it tensions between the system as a system of the people, and the
system as an enforceable system of law. Because the root idea is that
through representative democracy something will happen which is
23. See generally Sager, supra note 18.
24. See Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 1797-98
(1991) (criticizing Justice Scalia for his unwillingness to accommodate the fact that
constitutional adjudication ultimately requires exercises of judgment, and cannot rely
upon firm objective rules).
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called lawmaking and self-government, there is a prima facie worry
about interference. To put it differently, given that every entity that
has power sometimes exercises that power poorly, we can know in
advance that the Court, if it interferes too often, will frequently
exercise its raw power poorly. When it does, the result will be a
usurpation of the people's proper power. This is a very serious kind
of event in our system, one which the Court should strive mightily to
avoid. That means that the Court has a substantial reason to hesitate
in striking down legislation. In effect, therefore, it will often have
good reason to abide by a norm of deference in interfering on these
matters. The Court's New Deal openness on Article I powers was not
an innovation, in this view. It was a return to a well-entrenched,
fundamental norm of our popular democracy. In its recent foray of
aggressiveness on Article I review, the Court has wrongly been
dismissive of these norms. And note that in the Article I-power
debate, the recognition of other means of state input on power-
sharing issues is particularly apt (more apt, for example, than on
individual rights).
Why do I call this view softer? It is softer for many reasons. First,
and most importantly, it ultimately depends on a claim about a norm
of deference. This is less aggressive and less sharp than a claim that
the prerogative to interpret the Constitution lies, ultimately, with
another branch. It is less aggressive because the power is ultimately
the Court's and it is an affirmative decision to exercise it sparingly-as
opposed to the power's being either nowhere at all to begin with, or
with the people, or with Congress and Kramer's claim that the Court
should not take it away. I do not want to overemphasize this point,
for if the norm of deference is deeply rooted and fundamental
enough, then it is somewhat misleading to say that, in the first
instance, the power is with the Court.
Second, it is softer-edged because we do not know just what
deference amounts to, what it means, or what "level" of deference is
required. To this extent, we rely upon exercises of judgment. In
discussions with Kramer, and in his writings, one can see that he is
tremendously disturbed by the Rehnquist Court's display of poor
judgment. He is sometimes quite candid in his book about the legal
academy's lack of judgment too-as, for example, when he claims that
it would be fatuous to deny that the Burger Court was activist." Now
of course we all want, in our theoretical work, to be able to go beyond
saying that some legal actor is wrong because he or she has displayed
poor judgment. But I think there are many ways to go beyond this.
One of the points of providing history as rich and detailed as Kramer's
is to place what we are doing in context, so that we do not display the
vices of judgment that come with ahistoricality, self-centeredness, self-
25. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 229.
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importance, and self-absorption. To say that judicial supremacy must
be tempered by judgment free of these vices is perhaps to be more
vague and philosophical sounding than Kramer would like. But if it is
really meant seriously, it is not a trivial claim at all.
Third, the tempered supremacy I am articulating is softer because it
is rooted more in a historical self-understanding, and an entrenched
practice, than in a political theory as such. This risks the objection
that it is question begging, for one might argue there should be a
political theoretical defense of the claim that historical self-
understanding and entrenched practice has normative force. Again,
because it is not only rooted in those, I do not want to overemphasize
the softness point.
Together, these three kinds of "softness" regarding the tempering
of supremacy are significant. For what they mean is that there is
nothing categorically wrong or categorically illegitimate with judicial
review or adherence to, and enforcement of, judicial supremacy. Not
only is the raw power in the Court to declare legislatively enacted
provisions of law unconstitutional and then to adhere to that
determination in the face of public opposition, but it is entirely
possible that the proper power to do so is there, too. The question of
whether a Supreme Court that adheres to its own view in the face of
public opposition has overstepped its legitimate bounds is not a
matter that constitutional structure, political theory, or history will
answer as a categorical matter. It will depend on how well the Court
is exercising its judgment in declining to defer to what is frequently a
more popularly expressive view. This is a judgment that must be
exercised within a system that depends both on taking constitutional
law seriously as a constraint on lawmaking and on judges as capable of
appreciating the delicate balances involved in constitutional
democracy and on deferring where an appropriate harmonization of
these forces requires doing so. To the extent Kramer is suggesting
that a judiciary is unlikely to exercise its judgment well if it fails to
attend to a political and historical backdrop within which the
harmonization must be realized, he is right. But unless the norms of
deference to the people present themselves in a manner ready for
application-and Kramer must, at some level, be aware that they do
not-the tempering of supremacy is a messier business than Kramer
sometimes concedes. More precisely, the current Court's failure to
defer to Congress and other expressions of popular will does not,
contra Kramer, reveal a misconception of the proper scope (and
strength) of judicial review or judicial interpretive authority. To the
extent that the Court ought to defer, its failure to do so manifests poor
judgment on the issue of when judicial authority should be exercised
in a manner that displays respect for the democratic process and
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project, or, in a phrase of Martin Van Buren's that Kramer highlights,
"a proper respect for the people. 26
26. Id. at 246 (quoting Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of
Political Parties in the United States 352 (1867)).
[Vol. 731476
